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"The term 'proximate cause' is applied by the courts to
those more or less undefined considerations which limit liabil-
ity even where the fact of causation is clearly established."'
In Stone v. Bethea2 the plaintiff was negligently injured by
a third party who had stolen the defendant's car. The de-
fendant had left the automobile parked in front of his laundry
with the keys in the ignition. The plaintiff based his allega-
tion on the unattended motor vehicles statute,3 contending that
the act of leaving the keys in the ignition allowed the thief to
steal the car and thereby rendered the defendant liable.
In affirming a decision for the defendant, the court held
that the statute was not applicable to vehicles parked on
private property,4 and turned its decision on the issue of
proximate cause. The court found that the intervening crim-
inal act of theft and the thief's own negligence were the
proximate causes of the injury.5 The defendant, the court
concluded, could not have foreseen the intervening theft or
the negligence of the thief.6
The holding of the court appears to have seriously impaired
the applicability of the statute because the court stated that
even if it had been decided that the defendant had breached
the statute, the proximate cause issue would have demanded
the same decision.
B. Statutory Duty of Care
The cases of McCullough v. Gatch and Blackwell v. Gatch7
were consolidated and heard together on appeal. The plaintiffs
ran into a cow belonging to the Palmetto State Hospital and
sued the supervisor in charge of the state farm from which
1. W. PfossEr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 282 (3d ed.
1964).
2. 161 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1968).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-491 (1962).
4. See Roberts v. Campbell, 157 S.E.2d 867 (S.C. 1967).
5. See Johnston v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 183 S.C. 126, 190 S.E. 459
(1987).
6. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Carter, 249 S.C. 168, 153 S.E.2d 312 (1967).




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
TORTS SURVEYED
the animal had wandered. The plaintiffs offered no evidence
except as to the immediate circumstances of the collision, but
the trial court felt that the unexplained presence of the cows
on the highway raised a jury issue of whether or not the
defendant had breached the duty of care prescribed by a crim-
inal statute dealing with domestic animals running at large.
8
The jury found for the plaintiffs.
Since the statute itself required that the responsible per-
son must have willfully or negligently permitted the animal
to run at large, the supreme court had no trouble finding a
lack of evidence upon which to base the lower court decision.
According to the court the statute did not impose an absolute
duty to prevent the escape of livestock, and found that the
facts, under the most favorable light, would not help the plain-
tiffs.
In the case of Chilton v. City of Columbia,9 the deceased
drowned when he fell into a water-filled hole, located on the
extreme edge of an unimproved shoulder of a street. The
action was based on a statutory provision allowing suit to
be brought against any town or city when an injury to person
or property resulted from the mismanagement of any public
way under corporate control.10
In reversing the trial court and entering judgment for the
defendant, the court held the statute not applicable. It was
determined that a defect in a public way within the statutory
meaning concerned a physical condition of the improved por-
tion, or the existence of such a condition on or overhanging
the right of way, making it dangerous for a traveler exercis-
ing due care."
C. Duty of Care
In Rogers v. Schypers12 the plaintiff was injured as she
climbed a folding stairway. The plaintiff alleged negligence
on the part of the defendant, a corporation engaged in the
construction and selling of homes, and its president. The com-
plaint basically stated that the stairway was installed by
8. S.C. CODE AN. § 6-311 (1962).
9. 250 S.C. 132, 156 S.E.2d 419 (1967).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-70 (1962).
11. Accord, Stanley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 249 S.C.
230, 153 S.E.2d 687 (1967) (emphasis added).
12. 161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968).
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fastening it to the surrounding molding instead of properly
and safely nailing it in place. The question, one of novel
impression in South Carolina, was stated by the court to
be: After title passes, is a builder-seller of new houses liable
to the purchaser or his invitees for injuries sustained as a
result of negligent construction, and is such builder-seller
liable to such parties if he negligently or willfully fails to dis-
close such defects of which he knew or should have known?
In affirming the overruling of the defendant's demurrer,
the court applied the rationale of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,' 3 and stated that a builder-vendor of new houses owes
the same duty of care to purchasers as does the manufacturer
of chattels, which, if negligently constructed, are reasonably
certain to injure third persons.' 4
The deceased was killed, in Way v. Seaboard Airline Rail.
road," ' when struck by one of the defendant's trains. It was
found that at the time of the accident the deceased was a
trespasser, having entered an area on the track which was
prohibited from public travel. The court concluded, therefore,
that the defendant owed the deceased only the duty of not
willfully injuring him."6 In response to the plaintiff's alle-
gation that the train was traveling at an excessive rate of
speed, the court found that the railroad owed a trespasser no
duty to maintain any particular speed.17
D. Assumption of Risk
The plaintiff, in Honea v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co.,' was employed by a contractor who had been engaged
to install new equipment in the defendant's building. While
performing his job as a welder, he was injured by a work
elevator used to transport materials between the various floors
of the building. Suit was brought in federal district court
and a verdict rendered for the defendant. Among the trial
court's instructions to the jury was assumption of risk.
On appeal, plaintiff contended that such an instruction
was error since the theory rested on contract and was not
13. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14. See Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
15. 270 F. Supp. 440 (D.S.C. 1967).
16. See Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377
(1926).
17. Accord, Ingle v. Clinchfield R.R., 162 Va. 131, 192 S.E. 782 (1937).
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available in cases, such as the present one, where there was
no master-servant relationship. In affirming the lower court,
the appellate court held that, although the defense of as-
sumption of risk had often been limited to cases in which a
master-servant relationship existed, such relationship was not
a prerequisite under South Carolina law. In South Carolina,
the basis of the defense is not contract but consent, and is
therefore available without a master-servant relationship.19
E. Last Clear Chance
In Thomas v. Bruton 20 the deceased, a minor, was killed
as he jerked free from a playmate and his momentum car-
ried him into the road and in front of the defendant's truck.
The facts revealed that the defendant was driving in a man-
ner lawfully required of him and could not have avoided the
accident.
In holding for the defendant, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's allegation of "last clear chance," and stated that the
sole negligence of the deceased caused the accident.2 1 Since
the doctrine of "last clear chance" would presuppose negli-
gence on the part of the defendant, and there was none in
this case, the doctrine was held not applicable.
In Way v. Seaboard Airline Railroad22 in which there was
evidence that the deceased had been drinking but had not
been rendered helpless, the court again held that the doctrine
of "last clear chance" was not applicable.
23
In Smith 7v. Blackwell24 the deceased was lying on a rural
highway at night, dressed in tan clothing, when he was struck
by the defendant's vehicle. The defendant testified that he
thought the deceased was a brown bag or sack until it was
too late to avoid the accident. Other witnesses testified that
19. See Baker v. Clark, 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958). But see
Lawless v. Fraser, 244 S.C. 501, 137 S.E.2d 591 (1964); Cooper v. Mayers,
234 S.C. 491, 109 S.E.2d 12 (1959).
20. 270 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1967).
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-435 (1962) (Pedestrians must yield right
of way to vehicular traffic when crossing anywhere other than at inter-
section or crosswalk); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-433 (1962) (No pedestrian
can suddenly leave curb and walk or run into path of vehicle). See also
Carma v. Swindler, 228 S.C. 550, 91 S.E.2d 254 (1956).
22. 270 F. Supp. 440 (D.S.C. 1967).
23. See generally Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537,
63 S.E.2d 133 (1944).
24. 156 S.E.2d 867 (S.C. 1967).
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they had passed the deceased and had identified him as a
person, while one witness testified that he also had thought
the deceased to have been a crocus sack.
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court con-
cluded that although the deceased had been negligent in
lying in the road, the jury could have found that the neg-
ligence of the deceased had become only a condition of the
accident and did not combine and concur with the negli-
gence of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury.
25
The decision was reached by applying the formula of "last
clear chance" and finding that if the defendant had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the injury, and did not exercise it, only
the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the in-
jury. On the facts this result seems rather startling.
F. Self-Defense
The defendant, in Silas v. Bowen, 26 owned a parking lot.
The plaintiff was a professional basketball player stationed
at Fort Jackson. The plaintiff had a friend's automobile re-
paired on the defendant's parking lot by a third person who
was not an employee of the defendant. When the car did
not function properly, the plaintiff returned with friends
and demanded that the defendant, who had had nothing to
do with the repairs, fix the automobile. The defendant refused
and asked the plaintiff to leave. The plaintiff cursed the
defendant and grabbed his shoulder. The defendant reacted
by reaching for a gun to frighten the plaintiff and accidently
shot him in the foot. The plaintiff brought an action alleging
assault and battery.
In upholding the defendant's plea of self defense, the court
held that when one is on his own property he does not have
to retreat. The court also held that while abusive words
alone will not allow the use of a deadly weapon, fear of bodily
harm does warrant such action.27 Furthermore, when the
defendant asked the plaintiff to leave, the plaintiff became
25. See Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d
133 (1944).
26. 277 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1967).
27. See City of Gaffney v. Putnam, 197 S.C. 237, 15 S.E.2d 130 (1941).
See also State v. Self, 225 S.C. 267, 82 S.E.2d 63 (1954). The court stated
that in considering whether one is in reasonable fear of bodily harm, the
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a trespasser and the defendant could exhibit whatever force
necessary to remove the plaintiff.28
G. Contributory Negligence
In Brave v. Blakely29 the plaintiff stopped his car on the
side of the road at night, failing either to display cautionary
lights or to give any warning. Subsequently, defendant Me-
Cants ran into the plaintiff, and thereafter defendant Blakely
ran into defendant McCants. Defendant McCants counter-
claimed against the plaintiff and filed a cross-complaint
against defendant Blakely. The trial court rendered judg-
ment in favor of McCants against both parties.
The trial court found that McCants had been momentarily
blinded by oncoming lights. Whether or not one who pro-
ceeds under such conditions is negligent is a question for
the jury.80 The supreme court therefore affirmed the deci-
sion against the plaintiff in favor of McCants. It further
held that Blakely was following too closely behind McCants,
thereby making Blakely liable for injuries sustained by Mc-
Cants.
In Simmons v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,81 the de-
fendant admitted that the statutory signals82 were not given
before its train ran into the deceased at a crossing. The
defendant, however, alleged that the plaintiff, a fifteen year
old girl, should be denied recovery on the basis of her gross
or willful negligence. 33 The facts showed that the deceased,
while aware of the crossing, was not "familiar" with it, nor
was she driving at an excessive speed at the time of the acci-
dent. There was also evidence of a coal truck loading near
the scene, but there was no evidence that it interferred with
the deceased's view.
The trial court would not find as a matter of law that
the deceased had been contributorily negligent, and submitted
the issue of contributory gross or willful negligence to the
jury. In affirming the decision the supreme court stated that
the party alleging contributory negligence has the burden of
28. Shramek v. Walker, 153 S.C. 88, 149 S.E. 331 (1929).
29. 157 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. 1967).
30. See Beverly v. Saruis, 246 S.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 220 (1965).
31. 157 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. 1967).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-743 (1962).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-1004 (1962).
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proving it. Failure to do so affirmatively results in the pre-
sumption that the plaintiff exercised ordinary care, 4 and
the defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict. It is
presumed, moreover, that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, a person is exercising due care while traveling and is
depending on the proper functioning of the statutory warn-
ing signals required of railroads.3 5
In Rowe v. Fick36 the plaintiff was injured when he ran
across a highway and into the side of the defendant's auto-
mobile. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant could not
assert the defense of contributory negligence because the
plaintiff was nine (9) years of age and therefore did not
have the requisite capacity to be contributorily negligent.
In affirming for the defendant, the court stated that while
the presumption is that a child between the ages of seven
(7) and fourteen (14) does not have the capacity of judg-
ment and discretion to render him contributorily negligent,
such presumption may be rebutted by evidence of capacity.3 7
The court noted that the father and mother of the child had
testified that the child did know how to cross the highway
properly. Therefore, evidence of capacity had been estab-
lished sufficiently to send the issue of contributory negli-
gence to the jury.
The court, in Dixon v. Weir Fuel Company,3 8 held that
the deceased driver was contributorily negligent in driving
while intoxicated and that the deceased passenger was con-
tributorily negligent in riding with a driver, knowing the
driver was intoxicated.
II. PERSONAL TORTS
A. Slander and Libel
In an action brought before a board of arbitrators, one Cor-
bin was representing a group of insurance companies against
another group. Each group submitted their facts and argu-
ments to the board in the form of letters. Corbin brought
34, Thornton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 98 S.C. 248, 82 S.E. 433 (1914).
35. Thompson v. Southern Ry., 208 S.C. 49, 37 S.E.2d 278 (1946).
36. 159 S.E.2d 47 (S.C. 1968).
37. See Hollman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 201 S.C. 308, 22 S.E.2d 892
(1942).
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this action alleging that the letter presented to the board by
the defendant had libeled him in his capacity as an attorney
and adjuster. While admitting that the libelous words were
qualifiedly privileged, the plaintiff asserted that the de-
fendant had gone beyond the immunity afforded by a quali-
fied privilege.
The issue, one of novel impression in South Carolina,
concerned the extent to which the doctrine of privilege ap-
plied in cases before a board of arbitration.
The court stated, in Corbin v. Washington Fire & Insrance
Co., 9 that although the general rule of absolute immunity
has normally been afforded only to judicial and legislative
proceedings and acts of state,40 an arbitration is an excep-
tion.41 The court based its conclusion on public policy, stat-
ing that an arbitration is quasi-judicial and is favored by the
law.42 The arbitration proceedings, therefore, as well as the
arbitrators themselves, should be clothed with an absolute
immunity. The court continued that only in cases where it
was determined that the libelous statement was not relevant
to the proceedings would there be an action for damages.
43
In Oswalt v. State Record Co.44 the plaintiff, a police of-
ficer, had chased a speed violater who, during the chase,
had an accident in which two people were killed.
The defendant newspaper published an editorial criticising
the action of the police in their pursuit tactics and named
the plaintiff in referring to this specific instance.
The court stated that the article came within the tort doc-
trine of "fair comment.145 The newspaper, therefore, had
a qualified privilege as a matter of law to discuss the actions
of the defendant within the confines of his public office. The
39. 208 F. Supp. 393 (D.S.C. 1968).
40. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. 287, 67 S.E.2d 425
(1951).
41. Other exceptions have also been made. See, e.g., Carver v. Morrow,
213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948) (suit against an executor alleging defa-
mation in a will which had been filed); State v. Drake, 122 S.C. 350, 115
S.E. 297 (1922) (alleged defamation arising from a letter written to rebut
charges made in a fraternal organization).
42. See Bishop v. Valley Falls Mfg. Co., 78 S.C. 312, 58 S.E. 939 (1907).
43. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Newsome, 206 S.C. 269, 33 S.E.2d 585
(1945).
44. 158 S.E.2d 204 (S.C. 1967).
45. See generally W. PRossim, HANDBOOK or um LAw or ToRTs § 110,
at 812-16 (3d ed. 1964).
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court concluded that an action for damages would lie only if
the criticism was not honest and fair or was made with
actual malice.40 Furthermore, the court held that under the
constitutional restriction instituted by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,47 a "public official" cannot be awarded, by a
state court, damages arising from defamatory statements
concerning his office unless the official can show actual mal-
ice. In the present case the plaintiff offered no proof of
actual malice.
B. Malicious Prosecution
In White v. Coleman,4 s our court restated the general rule
that to sustain successfully an action for malicious prosecu-
tion, the plaintiff must show that the action instituted against
him was malicious, without probable cause, and that the
action terminated in favor of the plaintiff.49 In applying
these principles, the test of probable cause is one of reason-
ableness.
Where a solicitor had advised the defendant to bring a
particular action50 and where the grand jury returned a
"true bill," the test of reasonableness had been met and
probable cause established. Therefore, the plaintiff failed
to establish one of the necessary elements of malicious prose-
cution.
C. Fraud
In Davis v. Upton5' the defendant had accepted a $900.00
deposit from the plaintiff toward the construction of a
house. The defendant had stated that he would arrange for
the plaintiff's financing and that if the construction or the
financing could not be arranged, the deposit would be re-
turned. When financing was not arranged and the defend-
ant refused to return the deposit, an action for fraud and
deceit was instituted.
46. Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Co., 220 S.C. 492, 68 S.E.2d 415
(1951).
47. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
48. 277 F. Supp. 292 (D.S.C. 1967).
49. See Margolis v. Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 122 S.E.2d 417 (1961). See
also Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 S.C. 59, 111 S.E. 882 (1921). This ease
stated that the entry of a nolle prosequi by a solicitor is sufficient "termi-
nation" of an action to support a charge of malicious prosecution.
50. Prosser v. Parson 245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
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In affirming a non-suit against the plaintiff, the court,
after stating the general requirements for maintaining a
fraud and deceit action, 52 held that the fraud must relate
to an existing or pre-existing fact before the action will lie.
An exception occurs when one promises to do a certain
thing and at the time of the promise has no intention of
carrying it out.53 Here, the facts did not show a false in-
tention on the part of the defendant at the time of the
making of the contract, and the mere breach of a contract
does not, in and of itself, constitute fraud.5"
MICHAEL W. SMITH
52. See Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129
(1965). See also Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959).
53. Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler, 225 S.C. 354, 82 S.E.2d 454 (1954).
54. See generally Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959).
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